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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIOLA VOGLE WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v.-
MARCEL FELIX WILSON, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 8434 
This case came on for trial on September 16, 1955, 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, one of the judges of 
the Second Judicial District Court, sitting at Farmington, 
Utah. 
The facts are as follows: Plaintiff and defendant were 
married March 5, 1940. At the time of marriage plaintiff 
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was approximately 30 years of age and defendant 24 years 
of age. They had been married approximately 15 years. 
Hence, at the time of the divorce hearing plaintiff was 45 
years old and defendant 39 years old. (R. 2, 12, 20.) 
Prior to the marriage plaintiff had been employed as a 
saleslady in a shoe store in Salt Lake City for approximately 
10 years. (R. 12) Plaintiff was not, however, employed out-
side of her duties as a housewife during any period of her 
married life and as far as the record discloses did not con-
tribute any money or property in the acquisition of any of 
the assets accumulated by the parties during the marriage. (R. 
12) 
Except for a few weeks when plaintiff and defendant 
were first married and lived with plaintiffs parents, defend-
ant has supported and maintained plaintiff, and all of the 
assets accumulated during their marriage were purchased 
with money earned by defendant. (R 12, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 
26,30,35) 
At the time of the separation of the parties and at the fil-
ing of the complaint for divorce, plaintiff and defendant 
had accumulated the following property: 
I. Home in Bountiful purchased for $15,950.00. The 
fair market value of said home at the time of divorce was be-
tween nineteen and twenty thousand dollars. Subsequent to 
the signing of the decree of divorce plaintiff sold said 
property for a figure in excess of nineteen thousand dollars. 
There was a mortgage on said home as of August, 1955, in 
the sum of $9,352.74 (R. 13, 10, 50, Exh. g) 
2. A home in Salt Lake purchased for $2,700.00 and 
fully paid for at the time of the divorce hearing. The fair 
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market value of said home is between four and five thousand 
dollars. ( R. 13, 50) 
3. Furniture and furnishings in the Bountiful home of a 
value of four thousand dollars. (R. 13) 
4. Furniture in the Salt Lake home. The record discloses 
no estimate as to its value. Plaintiff testified that said Salt 
Lake home was "partly furnished." (R. 3) 
5. Uranium stock which was sold prior to the divorce 
hearing for $545.90. (R. 10) 
6. A joint hank account at Continental National Bank 
in the sum of $827.39, which plaintiff upon the filing of the 
divorce complaint immediately withdrew from said joint 
account and placed in an account in her own name in Walker 
Bank & Trust Company. (See Exh. A, R. 16) 
7. Tax refund check in the sum of $161.10. (R. 3) 
8. 1946 Oldsmobile of a value of $,95.00. (R. 50) 
Defendant, although not permanently employed at the 
time of divorce, is capable of earning from his labor an aver-
age of $250.00 to $300.00 per month. (R. 55, 56. See also 
Findings of Fact R. 29) 
Defendant does not contest the ruling of the court with 
respect to the granting of the divorce to plaintiff. The rec-
ord discloses that defendant asked plaintiff to secure a divorce 
for the reason that he was in love with another woman and 
desired to marry her. Plaintiff established sufficient grounds 
for divorce. 
Defendant at the time of the divorce hearing was receiv-
ing from the U. S. Government, as a result of a service con-
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nected disability-loss of hearing-$173.00 per month. 
(R. 52) 
Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the hearing and 
stated she was under the care of Dr. Earl Skidmore. She 
states that the last time she saw Dr. Skidmore was "last 
Monday." (R. 11) Plaintiff did not state what her physical 
defect was, but did state that she was physically unable to 
work right then. ( R. 11) She further stated that she had 
no further appointments to see Dr. Skidmore, but would 
probably go to him frequently. ( R. 11, 12) As to the 
purpose of plaintiff's visit "last Monday" to Dr. Skidmore, 
apparently said visit was to determine whether plaintiff 
could have children or not. Plaintiff stated at R. 33: "A. As 
of last Af. onday the doctor said he could see no reason why 
I haven't been able to have children." Apparently a great 
deal of the parties marital difficulties stem from the fact they 
had had no children, although both obviously had a desire for 
children. ( R. 28, 33, 34) It is defendant's understanding 
that plaintiff is gainfully employed at the present time. 
The court awarded to plaintiff the following: 
1. The Bountiful home. 
2. The Salt Lake home. 
3. The furniture, furnishings and appliances located in 
both homes. 
4. The $827.89 account in Walker Bank, which includes 
in addition to the $827.89, the tax refund in the sum of 
$161.10 which plaintiff, prior to the divorce hearing, de· 
posited in the Walker account in her name, or a total of 
$,988.99. 
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5. In addition to the above, the lower court gave plaintiff 
judgment against defendant in the sum of $5,000.00, pay-
able at the rate of $50.00 or more per month. The court 
stated in the Decree R. 33: "said sum is ordered paid by 
defendant in any and all events as in the case of alimony, 
except that said sum is intended as a portion of the alloca-
tion of property to plaintiff and shall not be subjected to 
future modification by reason of any change of circum-
stances of the parties, and shall be a charge upon the estate of 
the defendant as to any balance that should remain should 
he die prior to the full payment thereof." 
In addition to the above mentioned property, the court 
states in the Findings of Fact, with reference to the property 
accumulated during the marriage: R. 29. "A 1946 Olds-
mobile and personal effects belonging to the defendant, in-
cluding fishing gear, carpenter tools and four pieces of 
beauty shop equipment (3 chairs and hair dryer)." Other 
than the 1946 Oldsmobile, said other property-"fishing 
gear, carpenter tools and four pieces of beauty shop equip-
ment ( 3 chairs and hair dryer)" are not mentioned in the 
record as property accumulated by the parties. Further the 
court did not see fit to award the property to either party in 
the decree of divorce. Presumably the court felt the defend-
ant was entitled to the same as it is still in defendant's po-
session. Since this property was incorporated in the Findings 
of Fact somewhat extraneously, the court should not be 
offended if defendant states that said property, including 
the 1946 Oldsmobile automobile, could be readily duplicated 
for less than $250.00, even though such valuation ap-
praisal does not appear in the record. It is certain that the 
personal effects of plaintiff, including her wedding and 
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engagement rings and miscellaneous }ewelry, would be com-
parable in value to the above items. 
The sum of money, $545.90, received from the sale of 
the uranium stock was used to pay $250.00 to plaintiff's 
attorney (he had already received $100.00 previously from 
plaintiff), $14.80 costs of court, and $281.10 to defendant's 
attorney. See letter of defendant's attorney to court dated 
September 26, 1955-R. 27. 
It is upon this record that defendant seeks the aid of 
this court. Defendant asks relief from the oppressive judg-
ment which has been rendered against him, depriving him of 
all the assets acquired during 15 years of married life, and 
saddling him with a $5,000.00 judgment payable as alimony 
at the rate of $50.00 per month. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL 
DE NOVO AND A JUDGMENT FROM THE SUPREME 
COURT BASED UPON THE RECORD PRODUCED IN 
THE LOWER COURT. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT GROSSLY ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING THE AWARD OF ALI-
MONY AND DIVISON OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
WHEREBY DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF ALL THE 
ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING MARRIAGE AND, IN 
ADDITION, ORDERED TO PAY FIFTY DOLLARS PER 
MONTH FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED MONTHS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL 
DE NOVO AND A JUDGMENT FROM THE SUPREME 
COURT BASED UPON THE RECORD PRODUCED IN 
THE LOWER COURT. 
It is well settled law, by this court, that where the pro-
priety of an alimony or property distribution in a decree 
of divorce is raised on appeal, this court will review the evi-
dence in the nature of a trial de novo and appellant is 
entitled to the judgment of the Supreme Court as well as the 
trial court on this question. See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 
Utah 553, 63 P 2d 277, also Foreman v. Foreman, Ill 
Utah 72, 176 P 2d 144, and cases cited therein. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT GROSSLY ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING THE AWARD OF ALI-
MONY AND DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
WHEREBY DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF ALL THE 
ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING MARRIAGE AND, IN 
ADDITION, ORDERED TO PAY FIFTY DOLLARS PER 
~10NTH FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED MONTHS. 
Counsel for defendant have searched the Utah cases with-
out success to find something comparable to the case at bar 
which would justify the lower court in rendering the decision 
that it did. It is defendant's contention that the lower court 
grossly abused its discretion in making its decision. 
This court has held on many occasions that the ruling 
of the lower court will not be upset unless it is shown 
there was an abuse of discretion. In the instant case the 
lower court arrived. at an exceedingly unjust result. 
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The court at R. 57 of the transcript of the testimony 
stated: 
"The Court: I've thought this matter over. I think 
it's pathetic that the thing hasn't been settled to a greater 
extent than it has been between counsel. Of course, there 
is an impasse there. There's no question at all but that 
the lady is entitled a divorce in this matter on the ground~ 
of mental cruelty. The thing I'm faced with of course is 
the division of the property, deciding what to do about 
this property. 
"I'm mindful of several things about it. The one thing 
I'm most mindful about is what I've termed Amos and 
Andy, that is: Big judgments are hard to collect. A 
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush in this alimony 
business. At the same time I think under the law she is 
entitled to a certain amount of alimony because of 15 
years. If certain divisions are made, I have in mind 
offering this election to the plaintiff: At the same time, 
I might say I foresee that this man is about to go into an-
other marriage which is going to mean bitterness, almost 
unbearable bitterness, about the payment of alimony and 
that kind of thing. It's going to be a real human problem. 
I'm sure both counsel appreciate immediately the prob-
lems that are going to grow up as the years go by over ali-
mony payment. This is the election: I would like the 
plaintiff to make a choice. She may have all of the 
property except the check in evidence. 
"Mr. Duncan: I didn't get that. 
"The Court: She may have all the property except 
the check in evidence, and $5,000.00 payable $50.00 a 
month for one hundred payments for the next one hundred 
months, or she may choose between the two homes and 
have $10,000.00 at a hundred dollars a month, payable 
in one hundred installments. Please make a choice." 
The lower court, from the context of the statement given 
above, apparently was attempting to give to plaintiff suffi-
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cient so as to be supported the rest of her life, regardless of 
the equities of the situation. 
The decisions of this court have compared the dissolution 
of marriage by divorce as analogous to its dissolution by 
death and a general rule for allowance of alimony is one-
third of husbands property or one-third of his income. 
Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84. Also Bullen v. 
Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P 292. But that said amount is 
relative and must vary with the facts. Woolley v. Woolley, 
113 Utah 391, 195 P 2d 743. For instance where the wife's 
health has been affected by the husband's conduct then ali-
mony may be granted. Foreman v. Foreman Ill Utah 72, 
176 p 2d 144. 
"Effort should be made to place the parties as nearly 
as possible in the position they were immediately prior 
to the time they established their joint accounts, and 
joint ownership in bonds, and if for any reason either 
party cannot be placed fully in that status, he or she 
should be given credit in the form of a judgment for the 
shortage. In consideration of this matter the court should 
allow Mrs. Foreman a reasonable sum of money per 
month for such length of time as the court believes will 
enable her to readjust her life to her former position of 
self-support." Foreman v. Foreman, cited supra. 
In the case of Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P 2d 
265, and followed specifically by this court in Anderson v. 
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P 252, Justice Wolfe lists 
nine factors or elements to be given consideration by the 
court in awarding alimony and in settling property rights. 
They are as follows: 
I. What wer-e the ages of the parties when married? 
Plaintiff was 30, defendant 24. 
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2. What Is the duration of the marriage. In this case 
15 years. 
3. What did the parties surrender or give up by marriage? 
Plaintiff gave up a job as a saleslady in a shoe store. In 
return she has been supported and maintained during the 
15 years of married life. True she did not live in luxury, 
but as stated by plaintiff: "A. No, Mr. Gustin, we were never 
in a position that we were worried about money." Indeed, 
the wages of defendant were such that by his earnings alone 
they accumulated marital assets with a net value in excess 
of twenty thousand dollars. From all indications she lived 
better than she did prior to the marriage. 
4. What property, if any, the parties contributed by mar-
riage? Neither party entered into the marriage with any 
previous acquired property or money. Plaintiff was not 
employed outside of the home during marriage. Everything 
that the parties had at the time of divorce was gained by the 
parties during their married life from the money earned by 
defendant. 
5. What amount of property was held by the parties at 
the time of divorce? All of the property of the parties was 
held jointly except the 1946 Oldsmobile, which was in de· 
fend ant's name alone. The joint bank account was originally 
in the parties joint name, but was withdrawn by plaintiff and 
put in her own name. 
6. What is the ability and opportunity of each party to 
earn money? Defendant is 39 and has a trade as a hair 
dresser, which he can pursue. Defendant's earnings from said 
trade, as shown by the record, will yield him about $250.00 
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or $300.00 per month. There is also a good possibility that 
defendant can continue his trade for some years to come. 
Plaintiff has not worked for 15 years. The last job she 
held as a saleslady lasted for ten years up to the time of mar-
riage. Accordingly it will be more difficult for plaintiff 
to secure employment than defendant, but she is not entirely 
incapacitated from working. Plaintiff testified that she 
was under the care of Dr. Earl Skidmore and was physically 
unable to work. However, she does not disclose the nature of 
her physical disability. The last time she claims she saw the 
doctor prior to the hearing was for the purpose of determining 
whether or not she could have children. Further defendant 
understands plaintiff is working at the present time, which is 
good indication that plaintiff can, if she will, contribute to her 
own support. 
7. What are the financial conditions and necessities of 
each party, including abilities to save and care for earnings? 
The parties from their testimony have always lived within 
their means, regardless of how much def.endant earned. De-
fendant's first job as a cab driver paid him $80.00 to 
$100.00 per month. While defendant was in the army, the 
parties lived on defendant's allotment of $90.00 per month, 
plus earnings they had saved from defendant's prior earnings. 
It is obvious that the parties can manage their funds well 
and have done so right up to the time of the divorce, as is 
shown by their ability to accumulate the amount of property 
they have. The record shows that during the five and one-
half months between the time the divorce was filed and the 
trial (R 7) that plaintiff spent on an average of $163.21 
per month, which includes a payment of $90.13 per month 
on the Bountiful house mortgage and a $100.00 payment to 
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her ·attorney during that time. The cancelled checks and 
bank statements (See Plaintiff's Exhibit A) further show 
that during said period of time plaintiff was purchasing 
clothes, shoes, etc., apparently as her needs arose, and taking 
care of her house, utilities, groceries, etc. 
Defendant's financial needs are not set forth in dollars 
and cents. He testified that he intended marrying, therefore, 
his expenses would be more than plaintiff's. 
8. What is the health of the parties? 
9. What is the standard or mode of living of the 
parties? 
Both the factors 8 and 9 have been discussed above and 
further comment is not necessary. 
It is impossible to conceive how the lower court could 
maintain it had arrived at a just decision, unless the court 
felt that defendant should be punished as the guilty party 
to the divorce. Of necessity, under our law and the decisions 
of this court, there must be a guilty party to every divorce, 
otherwise a decree could not be granted. However, this alone 
would not justify the court in exacting the proverbial "pound 
of flesh" in attempting to equalize the matter. 
The court in the Foreman case cited supra, criticized the 
trial court for just that thing: 
"It would seem from a r·eading of the above statement 
that what the court was attempting to do here was to 
compensate Mrs. Foreman for her suffering of the pangs 
of unrequited love-heart balm-and teach Mr. Foreman 
a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly within the 
issues of a divorce case such as this." 
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Every item of marital property, except a 1946 Oldsmo-
bile automobile of a value of $95.00, the court awarded to 
plaintiff. Approximately $120,000.00 in property was given 
to plaintiff and, in addition, a $5,ooo~oo award of "non-
modifiable" ·alimony is given to plaintiff to .be paid in all 
events, even after death from his estate. Such cannot be the 
law of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that this court reconsider 
the evidence presented in this case and make an equitable 
distribution of the marital property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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